CHAPTER 3

ARCHIVE INDEX

Peacetime Navy until 7 Dec 1941. (Divided into Part I: June 1940 - Feb 1941 and Part II: Feb 1941 - 7 Dec 1941.)

In Pt. I, Glennon was on board the CINCINNATI and operating in the Pacific area from Pearl to the Philippines with a short trip to San Diego. Was impressed with the relaxed atmosphere of every phase of our operations.

Pt. II started as soon as we entered the Atlantic...The tempo of operations increased, the readiness preparations of the ship were improved, and the physical readiness of the ship was enhanced. We had arrived in the area controlled by Admiral King - a strict readiness advocate." Glennon provides detailed description of tempo of operations, readiness preparations, and enhanced physical readiness.

7 Dec - 31 Dec 1941. "On 7 Dec 1941 we were moored at Port of Spain, Trinidad. Next day CINCINNATI departed and went directly to the entrances to Martinique. Our mission was to prevent the departure of a French aircraft carrier...Later in the month we were sent to what is now Roosevelt Roads to detect German submarines..."Lesson learned: A hard task master (Adm King) is a requirement for armed forces transitioning from peacetime lethargy to wartime readiness."

Submarine design. Description of the trade-offs that were made along the way in arriving at the Los Angeles submarine design.

Background starts from the earliest submarines and leads up to the Los Angeles submarines. A large number of fleet boats were left over from WW II, and they were altered and modernized for some specific considerations. The biggest advance was made in the so-called Guppies, which was an effort to make the submarines go faster and be more maneuverable. The modern ejection torpedo system was developed and incorporated in ships and fundamentally remains the same today. This was a big advance in the weapons system in that it allowed the firing of torpedoes without the escape of compressed air which would give away the position of the submarine.

The first nuclear submarines to be designed with the so-called Albacore hull form were the Skipjacks. The next step was to redesign or start off with the basics of the 585 Class and to design the Thresher Class. The operating depth of the Thresher was nearly twice that of the Skipjacks. In addition a great deal of noise quieting was done throughout the ship. The Thresher Class was really a major step forward in the development of submarines. In fact it is the basis for the entire 637 and 650 Class.

In post WW II development, there were really two design activities: one was the Electric Boat Division in Groton, CT., and the other was Portsmouth News Shipyard in Kittery, ME. There was a great deal of friendly competition between these two activities; as a result submarine development was enhanced.

In the early days there were no real requirements for nuclear power plants, and the best size to be selected was really not known. As a result there was a family of 5 reactors developed. In order to save weight, the operating depth was reduced.

The environment today in the Washington arena has created a situation where it is very difficult to introduce new weapon systems. The period of time from concept of a new submarine to sea trials is about 15 years. As a result many new technologies or advancements have occurred in that time frame.

Further discusses design problems which are believed to have resulted in the Thresher loss in 1963. Capt. Jackson's understanding of the design is currently evolving for the SSN 21, and the major differences from his concept that should be incorporated in the SSN 21 design.

On the strengths and weaknesses of building submarine hulls with titanium: On a strictly strength to weight ratio titanium is very attractive. It is also corrosion proof in sea water and would go substantially deeper for the same weight as steel, or conversely, be much lighter to go to the same operating depth. The disadvantages is that basically it is very expensive material and costs a great deal to fabricate. In our country there is lots of titanium ore but it's very low grade. Further, the way titanium is currently fabricated, it has grains similar to wood. In this case it's stronger in one direction than it is in another.

Year of 1943. Glennon saw little combat in 1943. He was still in the submarine GREENLING and spent January returning to port at Brisbane at the end of his third war patrol. By happenstance, he was assigned to be XO of the submarine GUARDFISH at Brisbane when the CO fell ill and Glennon became CO at the age of 23 while she was being refitted.

Glennon recounts an incident during which the GUARDFISH had to get underway and exchange berths in the strong currents of the Brisbane River with the very long NAUTILUS, a submarine that was notoriously difficult to maneuver. This was the first time that Glennon had handled a submarine underway without supervision.

Additional entries by Glennon:

Remarks of Captain Fred Clarke, USN (Ret.) Re the Submarine Guided Missile Program, prepared for Captain Philip Glennon, USN (Ret.)" Clarke explains how the Navy modified the German V-1 rocket's autopilot and engine into the Loon missile following World War II under the direction of ComSubDiv 51. He also describes the workings of the first Loon firing from a 50-foot rail affixed to the deck of the experimental missile submarine CUSK. The Loon was the predecessor of the Regulus I and II aerodynamic cruise missiles and the Polaris ballistic missile.

Benjamin Frana to Archive: Ensign Graham reported upon graduation to the battleship WEST VIRGINIA. On 7 December 1941, the WEST VIRGINIA moored starboard of the battleship TENNESSEE on Battleship Row adjacent to Ford Island in Pearl Harbor. When the General Alarm was sounded at 0755, Graham was aboard, and he ran forward and climbed the ladders to his Battle Station as Control Officer on the Air Defense Platform of the Starboard Director for the 5-inch anti-aircraft battery. Japanese aircraft, early in the attack, launched several torpedoes against the WEST VIRGINIA's port side, and the resulting explosions caused flooding on the port side and knocked out electrical power and started fires. She listed sharply to port, and while this was righted by counterflooding, the damage put the 5-inch anti-aircraft guns and other large-caliber guns out of action. One fragment of a bomb that had shattered the center gun of the TENNESSEE's three-gun Turret Two flew onto the WEST VIRGINIA's bridge and wounded the CO, Captain Mervyn S. Bennion, in the abdomen.

At this point, Ensign Graham left the Air Defense Platform and climbed to the control platform of the starboard boat crane to handle lines needed to move Captain Bennion to the TENNESSEE. Before he could be moved, however, flames engulfed the WEST VIRGINIA's bridge and Bennion perished in the fire. Graham then joined the TENNESSEE's gun crews and served there for the rest of the battle.

A few days later, Graham was ordered to report to the TENNESSEE where he was to serve in the Sixth Deck Division that was responsible for the 5-inch anti-aircraft battery. The TENNESSEE was pinned to the forward dolphin by the damaged WEST VIRGINIA, but the dolphin was blasted by a construction firm over the next few days, thus freeing the TENNESSEE. She moved to the Navy Yard in Pearl Harbor on the 15th, and five days later, in company with the MARYLAND and the PENNSYLVANIA, she steamed for Puget Sound. Ensign Graham remained in the TENNESSEE which she was being repaired at Bremerton and which she was operating with Vice Admiral Pye's battleship-based Task Force One on the West Coast in early 1942. He was promoted to Lieutenant, junior grade, in May. That August, the TENNESSEE shifted to Pearl Harbor, but in September she returned to Puget Sound for modernization.

According to Frana, he last saw Graham when he, Frana, detached from the battleship to go to flight training in September 1942. Sometime that fall or winter, Ensign Graham was accepted into naval aviation, left the TENNESSEE, and reported to New Orleans for flight training. The USNA Alumni Register lists Lieutenant Commander Graham as dying on 11 April 1945 in an airplane crash as a result of enemy action in the Pacific.

Ozzie Gray died on 8 Feb 1989. Following by Captain Hanley for the Archive:

After Gray received his commission, he went aboard the BB MISSISSIPPI and became Radio Officer. The ship was at Iceland when the war broke out and came back to Norfolk. Gray told Hanley that his communications group in the MISSISSIPPI located the German sub frequencies and were able to decipher their coded messages. When the US came into the war, the Germans sent a U-boat wolf pack on a straight course from Iceland to Norfolk figuring that the BB would head straight to Norfolk, and Gray persuaded the OTC that the BBs were in danger. As a result, when the BBs put to sea they took a course towards the Azores and went well south before turning for Norfolk.

(Note by Love: This is an IMPORTANT story. It may well explain this movement, although I cannot prove it. While the account of the MISSISSIPPI's course from Iceland to Norfolk is accurate, according to her Deck Log, the reasons for this are not altogether clear. German U-boats did cross the Atlantic in late December, of course, but they headed for Canadian waters. Other U-boats, from what I can uncover, were operating around Gibraltar and off the Azores. B-Dienst many well have broadcast a fake signal, although this implies that they were aware that their signal security was suspect, something that goes against the grain of the literature. Research much be done in German records to confirm the message and to confirm the movement of U-boats (Gray's story does not suggest how far they progressed into the Atlantic) to get a better grasp on Gray's account.)

Memo, undated, 1943: Gray lists his experiences in 1943. He was a Turret Officer in the battleship MISSISSIPPI when the year began. She was operating as part of TF 64 in the Guadalcanal area. In February, she returned to Pearl Harbor escorting some damaged ships, Gray was detached there, and he reported to the new battleship NEW JERSEY at Philadelphia in April. (Gray observes that "commissioning [the] NEW JERSEY was an unmitigated nightmare. "All the senior officers, including the captain, came from Washington, and they had no idea what the front line was like. Most of the division officers and junior officers came from the Guadalcanal campaign and other Pacific actions. We fought almost continuously with the senior officers about getting the ship ready for Pacific duty."

Gray explains some of the complexities of getting the guns ready to fire. "The ships organization was all screwed up. Instead of using the traditional ship watch quarter and station bills, we had a screwy new idea (based on IOWA) of splitting up the crew based on battle stations. To wit: every time a man changed his battle station, it completely changed his watch section, mess section, and sleeping place. Finally, after going through a nightmare of so-called shakedown, the senior officers finally conceded that it was an absolute failure and we changed the whole system back.

Impressions until 7 Dec 1941:1. Gray served in the battleship MISSISSIPPI upon graduation. He pointed out that, "starting in September 1940 through 19 May 1941, the whole atmosphere changed into war preparedness." The ship returned to Bremerton Yard in the fall of 1940 for additional AA guns, and, upon returning to Pearl, Gray "found vastly tightened security around the base, submarine nets across the entrance, motorboat patrols, sentries posted around the perimeter. VP patrol planes were sent our every evening for extended air searches. (Personally, I made many motorboat patrols, particularly the submarine boom entrance, and made thorough searches of vessels (commercial) entering the harbor.) The entire security efforts were anti-submarine and anti-sabotage penetration." (This is an important observation that conflicts with the standard account of Pearl Harbor as being rather sleepy and unprepared.)

MISSISSIPPI received secret orders on 19 May, 1941, to transit the Canal and join the Atlantic Fleet. Rendezvoused with IDAHO and NEW MEXICO at Guantanamo, painted ships for war, and steamed for Norfolk in June 1941. MISSISSIPPI was on second Neutrality Patrol sweep when there was a submarine scare. The escorting destroyers attacked a sound contact, and dropped depth charges which rattled the battleship.

In October, MISSISSIPPI joined with IDAHO and screen to seal off the Denmark Straits to the TIRPITZ, which had just disappeared from the Norwegian fjord where she usually anchored. During this sortie, the battleship ran into a storm and was so severely damaged that she was still being repaired when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. MISSISSIPPI left Halfjord, Iceland, on 9 December, 1941, evaded a submarine wolfpack enroute, and arrived on 16 December at Norfolk. (Class of 1940 radio expert claims to have broken German signal to effect that U-boat concentration aimed at intercepting the BBS. Good point to research.)

Comments on Iceland. "The old battleships in particular, and most U. S. ships, were neither prepared nor built to operate in Arctic waters. The relatively low freeboard made them very wet even under normal conditions in the North Atlantic."

General: "As Gunnery Officer of the MISSOURI (BB 63) from 27 July 1951 - 31 Aug 1953, I served in Korean waters, 19 Oct 1952 - 4 Apr 1953...." Problems: "My main problem, as Gunnery Officer, was to train our young inexperienced director officers in the technique of shore bombardment....""After all our efforts at increasing our accuracy, we were able to drop a first round within 25 yards of the targets at all ranges...."

Greenbacker, John E.

"I really had no impression of the real "peacetime Navy" from the time I reported on board YORKTOWN (CV 5) in July 1940 until 7 Dec 1941. In the first place, the President had ordered the fleet kept at Pearl Harbor after the fleet exercise earlier in 1940. That in itself disrupted what was the usual peacetime routine when the fleet was maintained and operated from its home ports on the West Coast and created a shortage of officers, at least in YORKTOWN. We were immediately put in jobs that normally were held by junior officers with a year or more of shipboard experience. I was made assistant navigator under the famed Apollo Soucek."

Greenbacker was in command of the British-built SC 1472 at the Boston Navy Yard at the beginning of the year. He pointed out that the British-built subchasers were faster, at 20 knots, than U. S. Navy subchasers, which made 14 knots. "As an antisubmarine vessel, it had serious limitations. The sonar transmitter could not be rotated. For search the beam was transmitted to both port and starboard simultaneously. This meant that when contact was obtained, it could not be ascertained whether it was port or starboard. Doctrine called for a 45 degree turn and continued search." (Note: The description of the British-built subchaser is very important. We cannot locate this in any other standard history of the Battle of the Atlantic and it appears to bear heavily on the difficulty SCs had in ocean and coastal escort operations. "One wonders whether these boats ever made a successful attack." )

He refers to turning back equipment to the British when he took delivery of vessel. "We also lost a monument to British ingenuity and improvisation: something that looked like a signal projector which threw straight up an ordinary hand grenade, a pitiful defense against the Stuka dive bomber."

Greenbacker took the SC to Miami where he received orders to the destroyer escort STEWART (DE 238) as executive officer. (Note: Greenbacker's account of the problem of fresh crews, reserve officers and recently-commissioned petty officers is one of the best around on the difficulties of organizing the large DE force.)

STEWART sailed to Bermuda for shakedown and training. He gives great credit to Captain James Holloway for organizing and administering DE training. Greenbacker recounts differences in doctrine and training between the SC school in Florida and the older destroyer community. (Note: This is important. Useful for research on ASW doctrine development in WWII Battle of the Atlantic.)

Greenbacker left the STEWART in September 1943 and later that month took command of the (DE 150) NEUNZER (see Virgil Gex's file). NEUNZER sailed to Quonset Point, Rhode Island, where she worked with the ASW Development Group on means to counteract the new German acoustic torpedo. Greenbacker explains attempts to improve on the British FOXER gear and the failure to find anything better. (Note: This would be marginally helpful for research on ASW technology in WWII and thereafter.)