CHAPTER 3

By letter dated 20 February, 1998, to Bill Carpenter, Campo describes "Distinguishing Features in My Naval Career" plus a detailed listing of biographical data (all in the main archive).

Jim Cannon died 29 Oct 1952. Benjamin Frana prepared a brief list of his years with Cannon while they were serving together in the battleship TENNESSEE. See Frana, "James E. Cannon, Experiences." This is an account of the TENNESSEE's movements between July 1940 and 29 December 1941 when she arrived at the Puget Sound Navy Yard after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Carlson's study "[Postwar] Technology" involved the Navy's first large-scale use of digital computers. His study concluded that a digital NTDS was feasible and laid the groundwork for the NTDS system in use today. (Research on the origins of NTDS is sadly lacking and this is an excellent source to begin.)

Carlson also relates a story about selecting a new height-finding radar for the Navy's deep draft ships. Carlson served on a committee that examined the various proposals and ranked the contractors for the new system. The fourth-ranked contractor, not the top-ranked, was awarded the contract, and it was located in Texas, the home state of then-Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson. Carlson felt "that all the work we had put in was wasted effort."

Aboard the destroyer FOOTE as Gunnery Officer: Before the FOOTE headed for the Pacific, Austin became the Division Commander. The FOOTE transited the Panama Canal, entered the Pacific, stopped over at Pearl Harbor and Noumea, and finally reached Tulagi. After a few trips up the Slot, Captain Arleigh Burke became the new squadron commander.

Carlson recalls that "operations increased markedly under our new commodore, who had shifted his flag to [the destroyer] AUSBURNE." "A typical day of operations consisted of getting underway about 1630 so that we were under friendly air cover until darkness. We intercepted Jap traffic of all sorts during the night and hightailed back to get under friendly air by daybreak. We would arrive at Tulagi, load ammunition and supplies, take a short break in our bunks, atttend a briefing on the night's operations, and then get underway again at 1630. I simply don't remember when we got any sleep."

Carlson was relieved during one of the brief trips to Espiritu Santo and took charge of a training facility on Aori Island. Although he was not on board, Carlson describes what occurred during RADM Anson Merrill's action when the FOOTE failed to properly execute a countermarch signal, made a normal turn instead, and got hit by an enemy cruiser while trying to regain her station. "It was chiefly through the skill and leadership of her Exec, Max Schmedling, that she made it back to port."

"The following Notes on the battle of Midway were submitted to Walter Lord who was writing a book about the Battle of Midway in 1966." Carlson served in Sky Aft and controlled the port 5-inch AA gun battery on board the CA ASTORIA which was part of the YORKTOWN task force during the Midway battle. Good account of AA gunfire during Midway. "After the battle, several of the destroyers who had picked up the survivors of the YORKTOWN transferred them to the cruisers who had more space to accommodate them. I recall that we had a impressive class reunion with our classmates from the YORKTOWN. Harold Williamson, Bill Keating, and Joe Snyder joined our group which consisted of Carl Sander, Vin Hedley, Ike Blough, Lon Wellman, and myself."

"A Wild Night: The First Battle of Savo." Carlson was in the ASTORIA's Sky Aft controlling the port 5-inch battery when she approached Guadalcanal to kick off Watchtower on 6 August 1942. Carlson describes his experiences when the cruiser was sunk in the Battle off Savo Island on the evening of 8 August. Carlson points out that the damage control parties had the fires in the ship under control, but that they could not prevent her from listing owing to two holes in her hull.

Carlson also recounts experiences as XO of the newly constructed destroyer DOUGLAS H. FOX. While the ship was building in Seattle, Carlson was at Treasure Island training most of the crew. Account includes action off Okinawa during which the ship was disabled by a Kamikaze. Encl is CO DOUGLAS FOX to CominCh, 24 May 1945, Subj: Action Report - Action against enemy aircraft attacking this ship while on Radar Picket Station Number Nine off Okinawa, Nansei Shoto, 17 May 1945, a 14-pp action report. Very good. Encl "Destroyer Action" as told by Miles E. Lewis, Chief Yeoman, USNR. Colorful account of the attack.

1. #6. After graduation, Carpenter was the junior officer in the first division on board the OKLAHOMA, which was sunk in the Pearl Harbor attack. Went on board SAN JUAN (CL 54) in the spring of 1942, ended as LCDR gun boss in 1945. About a month or so before Pearl, OKLAHOMA and ARIZONA had a collision at sea during night maneuvers. OKLAHOMA was sent in to Pearl Harbor for repairs.

The life of an ensign on board a battleship was not a hard one. One of my ambitions was to get qualified as a catapult officer—was about to qualify, but ship was sunk.

2. #1. Has no useful information on classmates killed in wars. Carpenter was not onboard OKLAHOMA when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, was with new bride in Honolulu. Traces the day's events of the day of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Two rumors were heard: Japanese paratroopers were landing in the hills behind Honolulu. Some 40 or 50 sailors, armed with Springfield rifles, were loaded on a stake-bed truck and sent off in the direction of in back of Honolulu-- I never heard what happened. Another rumor said that all water on the island was poisoned, and I recall that we opened up a Coke machine and passed around the bottles inside. Later, was among several ensigns ordered to the new air tracking and command center, where we plotted the patrol flights made each day, using the Army's radar to track them and search for possible enemy planes. Fighters were scrambled if an incoming plane on radar was not identified. There was no IFF then.

See also paper delivered at a seminar on the "Geopolitics of Security in the Greater Pacific Basin," held on 4 November 1987 in Honolulu, Hawaii, sponsored by the International Security Council. 37 pages.

Folder, "Presentation of Rear Admiral John D. Chase, Commander of the U. S. Navy's Military Sealift Command Concerning Civilian Manning of Selected Fleet Support Ships to the Seapower Committee, House Committee on Armed Services, on March 6, 1974." Rear Admiral John D. Chase, Asst Dep CNO (Logistics) "Navy Occupational Safety and Health - A SitRep," 26 Nov 1977.

This material is submitted relative to the Military Sealift Command in 1971 -72 -73- 74 when I was Deputy and then Commander. It contains some added thoughts I have, particularly with regard to MSC performance in the Gulf War Desert Storm. As a prior Commander of MSC I was of course delighted when the entire command was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for performance in that conflict. There are also some remarks about the enhanced role of MSC in the role of Fleet Support.

In Viet Nam as in all major US military operations overseas the vast majority of logistical support came by sea. In this case it was about 95%. For Viet Nam, initially that material was carried in break bulk ships, both American and foreign owned, and mostly under charter. After the container port was established at Camn Ranh Bay a large proportion shifted to container ships. However container ships are not well adapted to many types of military cargo, particularly aircraft and vehicles. With the container revolution in full swing it was clear that break bulk shipping would disappear for all practical purposes. It was also clear that the decline in the American owned Merchant Marine would continue and accelerate due to cost considerations. Accordingly we in MSC and some others in transportation felt that the US in the future would not be able to sustain a major overseas military operation , especially in the initial phases, without foreign support. We felt that it was important, indeed imperative, that the US take steps to increase, and markedly increase, the number of organic assets available. Over the years this policy came to fruition. Its success was dramatically demonstrated in the Gulf War with the timely support of the Marine Corps PrePositioning Squadrons and the prompt supply of Army equipment in the magnificent SL-7 ships, now government owned.

During this same period of time another MSC initiative came into being. Our first Fleet Support Ship, the oiler TALUGA, was recommissioned as the United States Naval Ship USNS TALUGA. She went into service with the Seventh Fleet in WestPac in 1972. MSC civilian manning of non-combatant type ships has many advantages for the Navy. Crews can be and are much smaller because they are all experienced. The Chief Engineer in TALUGA in 1972 had been an engineer in a similar ship during World War II and had served in them, mainly as Chief Engineer, for over thirty years, Every man in the crew had at least ten years at sea. Commercial tankers are supposed to be at sea. They lose money when they sit in port. With TALUGA there was no problem with an operating schedule away from home port. The Fleet Support concept has grown significantly. Better than half of today's Service Force, including AO, AFS, AFTF, and AE ships are now USNS with civilian crews. I understand that one of the AD tenders will be so transferred in the near future. This builds on another Viet Nam experiment. MSC manned a tender ship brought out of mothballs. She was anchored off Vung Tao and took on board a steady stream of Army Helicopters for maintenance and repair. The repair and maintenance crew was all Army but the ships crew was all USNS civilian. At that time the primary incentive for doing so was to improve the safety of the helicopters while they were being worked on. Today the chief argument in their favor is to save Navy billets with additional advantages of smaller crews and less concern for deployed time.

There is an additional factor helped by both the growth in organic Strategic Sealift and in Fleet Support. The decline in the US owned, ocean going Merchant Marine carries with it a corresponding decline in the number of experienced sea going sailors available in an emergency. This decline is at least reduced by the ever increasing number of civilian mariners at sea in MSC USNS ships. I'm quite certain that the number employed by any US carrier is exceeded by the total number of civilian sailors at sea in Strategic Sealift and in Fleet Support ships and I suspect that this total at least approximates the total employed by all US carriers.

There is one other aspect of MSC experience during my tenure which bears additional fruit today. We built nine point to point tankers by a "Build and Charter" ( now more correctly termed "Charter and Build") procedure. The ships were built with private money which in time was repaid by a long term charter to the Navy. This had been done earlier and it worked very well for our ships. My wife Elouise christened Sealift China Sea They served for twenty plus years and have now been retired. The Navy has used the procedure to produce Oilers as well as tankers OpNav is currently exploring acquiring all non combatants with this procedure. The overall goal would be to maximize the use of Navy blue suit assets, both money and people, in war-fighting roles and provide the support from civilian sources. Another recent example is the use of contracted civilian helicopter service to provide the vertical lift with the USNS TAFS ships. In closing I hope that our Class of 40 archive will give some recognition of the support provided by the Military Sealift Command and of the service rendered by the USNS civilian mariners.

I was assigned to compile an annual publication showing military manpower personnel statistics of all services. This was induced by Congress' concern that the military was getting too top-heavy with senior officers. However, I dug out a set of statistics showing the numbers and percentages of senior defense civilians had been much higher and was growing at more than twice the military rate. The publication of these numbers caused an upheaval and I was transferred to Okinawa a month later and the annual publication was discontinued.

Croft recalls witnessing what he describes as the "worst collision in navy history" between the battleships INDIANA and WASHINGTON which occurred on 1 February 1944 when the ships were operating with TG 58.1. Both battleships, in company with the battleship MASSACHUSETTS, left the formation with a four-destroyer screen and shelled Kwajalein Atoll on 30 January 1944 as part of the preliminaries to the landings in the Marshall Islands. On the morning of 1 February, the WASHINGTON, while maneuvering in the darkness, rammed the INDIANA when she cut across the WASHINGTON's bow while dropping out of the formation to fuel the escorting destroyers.

Croft was aboard the INDIANA on the midwatch that night when Denny Phillips relieved him at 0400. He recalls that "the captain assumed the conn at 0415 to maneuver the ship out of the circular formation to fuel destroyers pursuant to prior orders. The Captain worked out his course in the chart room and then proceeded to the open bridge -- he must have gotten confused because he turned the ship across the formation instead of away, and several minutes later the WASHINGTON collided at 19 knots" at 0415. Croft recalls that, "since I had been the OOD up until 15 minutes before the collision and Denny was the OOD at the time of the collision, both of us were called as 'star' witnesses at the Captain's court martial -- not a pleasant experience for us or the Captain."

"My personal opinion was that with the excellent surface radars all ships had, the accident should never have occurred. The lesson learned was that all officers, particularly the more senior ones, should learn more about the use of radar during maneuvers in reduced visibility. In general, the younger officers accepted and used radar much more effectively than did the old timers during the war." Both battleships put into the Majuro lagoon the next morning. The damaged bow was reinforced, but the WASHINGTON had to return to Hawaii for repairs on 11 February 1944.